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Rent Control—Is the Cure Worse
Than the Disease?
Brian J. Asquith
ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
n Research shows that rent
control incentivizes landlords
to at least temporarily
withdraw housing in response
to price increases—the
opposite of what
policymakers intend.
n Rent control is unlikely to
be a standalone solution to the
underlying problem plaguing
expensive cities: chronic
undersupply of housing.
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After a long period of neglect, a new generation
of policymakers and activists has embraced rent
control as a solution to the housing affordability
crisis plaguing America’s booming coastal cities.
The national median rent for a one-bedroom
apartment is $1,209 a month, but for some metro
areas it is considerably higher. Urban residents
suffering from the highest rents are mostly in
wealthy, coastal cities, such as San Francisco
($3,500), New York City ($2,860), San Jose
($2,480), Los Angeles ($2,360), Oakland ($2,100),
and Washington, D.C. ($2,160). In addition to
sharing astronomically high rents, these cities also
share another feature: rent control.
Rent-control regimes have operated in
these six cities for the better part of 30 years,
and they exist also in a host of smaller cities,
chiefly in California, Maryland, and New Jersey.
Undergraduate Economics 101 would have you
think that rent control is essentially a rent freeze,
but the reality is that rent control as practiced
today has evolved into a far more complex system.
The vast majority of today’s rent controls were
instituted in the 1970s and early 1980s in response
to the stagflation crisis, and are often referred to as
rent stabilization, tenancy rent control, or secondgeneration rent control to distinguish themselves
from their much-maligned predecessor. Since these
modern forms are really the only game in town, I
refer to them herein as just rent control.
Policymakers claim that rent control can allow
low- to moderate-wage workers to live close to
jobs in expensive cities. They also claim that these
rent-control policies would prevent families from
being displaced by high rents into substandard
housing. Even for families who stayed, the rent
controls would mean that they could more easily
afford other necessities, like food and health care.
This concern applies particularly to low-income
or fixed-income households, such as the elderly
and disabled. For example, Oakland’s rent control
ordinance claims to address a “severe housing

affordability crisis,” in which “60 percent of . . .
residents are renters, who would not be able
to locate affordable housing within the city if
displaced.”
The regimes share four prominent features:
1) The city grants landlords and tenants some
freedom to negotiate a starting rent, and then
caps subsequent rent increases according to
agency decree or prescribed formula. This
process, called vacancy decontrol, ranges from
restrained in New York City and Washington,
D.C., to completely unrestricted in California.
2) There is automatic lease renewal for existing
tenants, and landlords usually require “justcause” to evict a tenant. In practice, this means
that landlords must prove to a rent board or
court that tenants are being evicted for one of
a predetermined list of reasons. This prevents
landlords from turning over tenants at will and
locking in new base rents in response to market
shifts.
3) New buildings are exempt from rent control
unless the landlord opts in. Policymakers fear
discouraging new supply, so the rules control
only existing buildings and commit to not
extending controls further.
4) There are a series of landlord hardship
provisions, where landlords may petition to
pass certain operating expenses on to tenants in
order to cover costs with reasonable profit.
Table 1 shows how the details vary across cities,
but it also underscores how these systems share
more policy similarities than differences.
These measures were largely intended to be
temporary, but like many so-called temporary
regimes, rent control is the answer to an emergency
situation that never seems to end. One reason for
rent control’s persistence is that it redistributes
benefits from future tenants to present ones. One
influential study found that, after rent control was
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expanded to a new set of apartments
in 1994 in San Francisco, tenants in
affected buildings were 10–20 percent
more likely to remain at their 1994
address compared to tenants in the
control group. Since rent increases are
capped at less than the rate of inflation,
these tenants were (and in some cases
still are) effectively being subsidized
to live in their controlled apartments
for as long as they like. This creates a
powerful pro-rent-control constituency
that can be difficult for reform-minded
policymakers to overcome.
This de facto subsidy to stay in
place affects tenants’ labor market
outcomes. One study shows that
tenants absorb longer commutes

instead of yielding their rent-controlled
apartments, suggesting that keeping
the subsidized housing is more
valuable to them than moving closer
to a new job or switching job markets
altogether. Another study concluded
that the stronger the local rent-control
ordinance, the more likely a person was
to limit their job search to local jobs.
While rent control may allow workers
to stay close to high-wage jobs in
dense urban areas, it is not altogether
clear that this is in the best interests of
tenants or the economy in the long run.
Rent control’s distortionary effects
also extend into housing supply. The
policies in Table 1 collectively dampen
landlords’ profits in the controlled

Table 1 Major City Rent Control and Evictions Policies, October 2016
City

Subject to
controls if the
building is...

Max annual
allowable rent
increase

Vacancy
decontrol?

Just-cause
evictions?

Rental stock
coverage (%)

Los Angelesa

Built before
10/1/1978 and
has 2 or more
units

Regional CPI
rate, bounded
within 3–8%

Yes

Yes

85

Oaklandb

Built before
1/1/1983 and
has 4 or more
units

Regional CPI
rate, max of
10%

Yes

Yes

66

New York Cityc

Built before
1/1/1974 and
has 6 or more
units

Set by NYC
rent guidelines
board annually

No, rent
increase for
new base rent
capped at 20%d

Yes

47

San Josée

All rental units
built before
9/7/1979

Previously 8%
6/2016-: 5%

Yes

No, citymandated
arbitration
instead

33

Washington, DCf

An apartment
building built
before 1/1/1976

CPI + 2%, max
of 10%

No, rent
increase for
new base rent
capped at 10%

Yes

66

San Franciscog

Built before
6/13/1979 and
has 2 or more
units

60% of CPI, max
of 7%

Yes

Yes

72

a Los Angeles Municipal Code Chapter 151. Office of the Mayor of Los Angeles (2016).
b Oakland Municipal Code §8.22 et seq. Coverage figure comes Levin (2015).
c New York State Rent Regulation Reform Act of 1997, 1997 New York Laws 116; Rent Act of 2015, 2015 New York Laws 20; New
York State Emergency Tenant Protection Act of 1974, 1974 New York Laws 576 §5-a. Coverage figure comes from Sieg and Yoon
(2016).
d In both cities, landlords can appeal for a rent increase on new base rents of up to 30% if rents in comparable units are shown to
be higher.
e San José Municipal Code, Apartment Ordinance, Chapter 17.23. Coverage figure is from San José Municipal Ordinance No.
29730, p. 1.
f Code of the District of Columbia, Chapter 42. Coverage figure comes from Tatian and Williams (2011).
g Asquith (forthcoming).
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market. In the case of San Francisco,
landlords actually lose money since
rent increases are capped at 60 percent
of the inflation rate. In growing
markets, the gap between what a
landlord receives from a controlled
apartment and from one that allows
increases at the market rate compounds
over time. Because tenants in this
situation have strong incentives to stay
longer under rent control, landlords in
turn try to avoid tenants they suspect
will be “long-stayers.”
My own research asks: How do
landlords of rent-controlled properties
change their housing supply when
prices rise? Do they bring more units
to market? Or, in San Francisco, at
least, have policymakers imposed such
burdens on landlords that they actually
remove properties from the market? To
motivate this question, Figure 1 shows
evictions by quarter in San Francisco.
The left axis shows Ellis Act evictions,
by which landlords evict all tenants and
withdraw an entire building from the
market. Ostensibly, this occurs when
landlords no longer want to operate
their buildings, and so one might
expect these evictions to rise when
the economy slumps and vice versa.
Instead, Ellis Act evictions spike during
booms and fall during recessions. The
right axis shows “just-cause” at-fault
evictions, mostly tenants being evicted
for delinquent rent. Since tenants in the
controlled market are insulated from
price increases during booms, one
might expect this type of eviction to
rise during recessions as tenants’ ability
to pay falls. Instead, like Ellis Act
evictions (albeit less sharply), at-fault
evictions seem to rise in boom periods
and level off in recessions.
These relationships suggest
that landlords try to evade rent
control restrictions when it would
be especially profitable to do so,
such as by converting rental units to
condominiums. To test this hypothesis
more definitively, I examine how two
outcomes respond to market price
increases that affected San Francisco
neighborhoods differentially between

Frustratingly, there is little empirical
evidence on what happens to rent
prices when the number of housing
units in a neighborhood rises, with one
study suggesting prices may not move
much. Upjohn Institute economist
Evan Mast, Philadelphia Fed economist
Davin Reed, and I are currently
studying this issue using data on unitlevel migrations, rents, and building
openings.
Irrespective of the ultimate answer,
rent control is here to stay. The current
beneficiaries are well-organized,
numerous, and know what they stand
to lose from its repeal. The return of
rent control to the scholarly agenda
is thus propitiously timed to caution
policymakers and a frustrated public
that while soaring rent burdens are
indeed approaching crisis levels in
some places, rent control is a policy
that has yet to deliver on its promise:
affordable rents for all, not just for the
few lucky enough to score a controlled
apartment.

areas with the highest concentration
of controlled units. Additionally,
segregation may have decreased.
However, the evidence is not clear
on whether low- and middle-income
tenants in fact would have been better
off without rent control. So, what are
other remedies to help these groups
with housing costs? Government
programs have included Section 8
housing subsidies, low-income housing
tax credits to finance new housing,
and more recently, affordable housing
mandates. These programs offer some
help, particularly to poorer renters,
but generally do little to address the
housing needs of middle-income
residents facing excessive rent burdens
in expensive cities. Rent control’s lack
of means testing is thus a political
strength, because it can claim to be the
rare policy that helps middle-income
renters as well.
Despite popular demands for
government intervention on rents,
economists typically advocate for
increasing the housing supply.
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2003 and 2013. The first outcome
is whether landlords tactically evict
individual tenants to try to lock in
higher rents from new tenants. More
specifically, do landlords use justcause evictions to expel long-standing
but lower-paying tenants? In spite
of the pattern in the graph, I find no
statistically significant evidence that
landlords do this. Instead the evidence
suggests that landlords of rentcontrolled apartments are less likely
to turn over their tenants when prices
rise.
The other outcome is whether
controlled landlords outright exit the
market in response to a price increase.
I find that landlords do in fact respond
to rising prices by withdrawing
from the rental market via Ellis Act
evictions (or, in smaller buildings,
by withdrawing one unit from the
market by claiming a relative needs to
move in). This is a serious response,
because by law the landlords must pay
relocation fees and leave these units
vacant (or filled by a family member)
for at least three years or be subject to
sanctions.
The two results confirm that
the controlled market is distorted
compared to “normal” housing
markets. Landlords apparently expect
to make such little money on the
controlled market that they conclude
it’s better to exit the market entirely, at
least for a few years. If these landlords
are thus incentivized to reduce supply
as prices rise, it is hard to see how
rent control improves housing market
dynamics in these cities.
So, if existing evidence is that
rent control is distortionary, why not
abolish it? We have some evidence
on what happens when rent control
is repealed, and the result is generally
salutary (see, for example, Autor,
Palmer, and Pathak 2017). In January
1995, a Massachusetts law banned
rent controls, mostly affecting units
in Boston, Cambridge, and Brookline.
Property values in both decontrolled
and never-controlled units rose, while
property crime fell, especially in
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NOTE
1. Oakland rent control ordinance. https:
//oakland.legistar.com/LegislationDetail
.aspx?ID=2680738&GUID=BAED7BF3
-ED56-4A16-A876-37717D4E01D6&
Options=&Search= (accessed January 11,
2019).
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Labor Market Effects of
U.S. Sick Pay Mandates
Nicolas R. Ziebarth and Stefan Pichler
Background
The United States, Canada, and
Japan are the only industrialized
countries that do not provide universal
access to paid sick leave. In these
countries, sick pay is largely provided
as a fringe benefit by employers on a
voluntary basis (Heymann et al. 2010).
In the United States, coverage rates are
around 65 percent among full-time
workers; low-income, part-time, and
service sector workers have coverage
rates of less than 20 percent (Susser
and Ziebarth 2016). In a given week of
the year, Susser and Ziebarth (2016)
estimate that the total demand for paid
sick leave sums to 10 percent of the
workforce in the United States.
To date, sick leave legislation has
been passed in 11 states, the District of
Columbia, and dozens of cities across
the United States.1 They require that
employees must have the right to earn,
accumulate, and take sick days, typically
up to seven days per year. Some critics
are concerned that these mandates
cause substantial wage reductions for
employees, as well as job losses. Upjohn
Early Career Research Awardee Nicolas
R. Ziebarth of Cornell University and
colleague Stefan Pichler of ETH Zurich
published an examination of these sick
pay mandates in the Journal of Human
Resources (forthcoming).

Findings
The research team used
employment and wage data from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics from 2001
to 2016 to compare the labor market
dynamics of the cities and states with
mandates to “synthetic” control cities
and states over time. The research
assessed mandates in nine cities
(including San Francisco, Washington,
D.C., and New York City) and four
states (Connecticut, California,
Massachusetts, and Oregon).
The synthetic control group method
(SCGM) is a relatively recent statistical
method that allows researchers to draw
causal inference. In this specific case, to
benchmark the labor market dynamics
of cities and states that implemented
a mandate, the SCGM produces a
very similar synthetic control group
consisting of fractions of similar
counties and states.
Figure 1 illustrates the SCGM
and some select findings. The left
column shows the findings for three
areas—San Francisco, King County,
and New York City. The right column
shows the findings for three select
states, California, Massachusetts, and
Oregon. The x-axis represents the
normalized timeline in months up
to and since the mandates became
effective, and the y-axis shows the

ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
n Over the past decade, dozens of cities, eleven states, and the District of Columbia
have passed sick leave legislation.
n Sick pay mandates allow employees to earn and accumulate one hour of paid sick
leave credit per 30–40 working hours.
n Comparing employment and wage dynamics in cities and states that mandated
sick pay with synthetic control regions, there is no evidence that the mandates lead to
major disruptions of local labor markets.
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Figure 1 Employment Dynamics in Regions with Sick Pay Mandates Relative to Synthetic Control Regions
San Francisco County, California

California

0.8

0.8
California

San Francisco
Synthetic San Francisco

0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2

Synthetic California

0.7
Employment/population

Employment/population

0.7

0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3

-48

-36

-24

-12
0
Months to/from treatment

12

24

0.2

36

-48

-36

-24

King County, Washington

Employment/population

Employment/population

36

0.5
0.4
0.3

-48

-36

-24

-12
0
12
Months to/from treatment

24

36

-12
0
12
Months to/from treatment

24

Employment/population
Employment/population
Employment/population

0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3

-24

-12
0
Months to/from treatment

0.4
0.3

-48

0.8
0.8
0.7

New York
Synthetic New York

-36

0.5

-36

-24

Oregon

0.8

0.8

-48

0.6

0.2

36

New York City, New York

0.7

Massachusetts
Synthetic Massachusetts

0.7

0.6

Employment/population

24

0.8
King
Synthetic King

0.7

0.2

12

Massachusetts

0.8

0.2

-12
0
Months to/from treatment

12

24

36

0.7
0.7
0.6

Synthetic Oregon
Oregon Oregon
Synthetic
Synthetic Oregon
Oregon
Oregon

0.6
0.6
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.2

0.2 -48
0.2 -48
-48

-36
-36
-36

-24
-12
0
-24Months to/from
-12 treatment
0
-24
-12 treatment
0
Months to/from
Months to/from treatment

12

24

12
12

24
24

SOURCE: Pichler and Ziebarth (forthcoming).
NOTES: The solid vertical lines indicate the months when the mandates became effective, whereas the dashed vertical lines to the left indicate when the
law was passed, and the dashed vertical lines to the right indicate when the “accrual period” was over. Originally published in the Journal of Human
Resources (forthcoming). © 2018 by the Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System. Reprinted courtesy of the University of Wisconsin Press.
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outcome measure of interest—in this
case, the number of private sector jobs
as a share of the total population. The
blue lines illustrate the private sector
job development for the “treated” cities
and states that implemented a mandate,
and the orange lines illustrate the
employment dynamics for the synthetic
control counties or states.
An important condition for the
SCGM to produce valid findings is that

We do not find evidence that sick pay
mandates kill jobs or systematically
disrupt local labor markets.
the synthetic control group provides a
valid imitation of the treatment group
in premandate months; in other words,
the solid and the dashed lines should
match as closely as possible in the
months before the mandates became
effective. As seen, this is the case for all
cities and states evaluated. Technical
details aside, the difference in the
outcome for postmandate months then
illustrates the impact of the sick pay
mandate on employment dynamics of
the city or state.
As Figure 1 shows, there is little
evidence that employment dynamics
systematically either improved or
worsened after the introduction of a
sick pay mandate. The graphs look
very similar when assessing the impact
on wage growth in cities and states
with sick pay mandates and when
investigating specific industries, such
as construction or hospitality. More
details and results are in Pichler and
Ziebarth (forthcoming).
When carrying out formal
statistical tests about the difference
in employment and wage dynamics
in treatment and synthetic control
regions, these tests cannot reject the
null hypothesis of no differences at
conventional statistical levels. However,
the statistical tests cannot exclude
modest reductions in wage growth and
employment with absolute statistical

6

certainty, but nor do they find any
evidence for them.
Implications for Policy and Practice
The United States is one of three
OECD countries without universal
access to paid sick leave. Opponents
of sick pay mandates are mainly
concerned with negative employment
or wage effects. Yet, there is no strong
evidence of systematic and disruptive
labor market effects when cities and
states mandate that employees have
the right to earn and take sick days.
Concerns of massive labor market
disruptions are vastly overstated.
The absence of major labor market
disruptions may be a function of how
the U.S. mandates are designed. In
fact, they seem to be more incentivecompatible than their European
counterparts and minimize shirking
behavior, a main concern of opponents.
The reason for this incentivecompatibility is that paid sick days are
personalized, and employees “earn”
them. For every 30–40 hours worked—
that is, for every full-time week of
work—employees earn one hour of
paid sick leave. Unused sick days roll
over to the next year. Because earned
sick days represent a personalized
insurance credit (similar to health
savings accounts) for future health
shocks that are likely to occur (e.g., flu
or illness of a child), we expect shirking
to play a minimal role for most
employees.
However, wages and employment
could still be significantly affected
because of administrative burdens or
psychological effects when employers
overestimate the actual relevance
for their businesses. The findings in
Pichler and Ziebarth (forthcoming),
however, show that this was very
likely not the case. They are able to
exclude employment losses of more
than 2 percent and wage reductions of
more than 3 percent at conventional
statistical levels.
Together with research showing that
influenza-like illness rates decrease as

a result of the mandates (Pichler and
Ziebarth 2017), this finding suggests
that the mandates can be an effective
tool to increase workers’ health and
well-being.
NOTE
1. For an overview, see https://www
.abetterbalance.org/paid-sick-time-laws/
(accessed January 11, 2019).
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Nicolas R. Ziebarth is an associate professor at
Cornell University, and Stefan Pichler is a research
associate at ETH Zurich.
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W.E. Upjohn Institute Welcomes Michael Horrigan as Its New President
The W.E. Upjohn Institute for
Employment Research has chosen Michael
W. Horrigan to be its next president.
Horrigan,
an associate
commissioner
with the
Bureau
of Labor
Statistics,
begins his new
job March
4. Horrigan
succeeds
Randall W.
Eberts, who
announced
his retirement from the president’s role last
March after 25 years leading the Institute.
Eberts remains with the Institute as a senior
researcher.
Horrigan came to the BLS as a labor
economist in 1986, after six years as an
economics professor at Williams College in
his native Massachusetts. He rose through
the ranks as a division chief, the director
of the National Longitudinal Surveys
Program and assistant commissioner
in two offices. He served as associate
commissioner for the Offices of Prices and
Living Conditions before taking his current

role of associate commissioner in the Office
of Unemployment and Unemployment
Statistics in 2014.
In 1991, Horrigan was finishing a oneyear term as a senior labor economist with
the Council of Economic Advisers when
he met Eberts. “I was replacing him as one
of the senior staff economists,” Eberts said.
“Now he is replacing me as president of the
Institute, more than 25 years later. In the
interim, Mike has established himself as
one of the premier labor economists in the
country.”
Horrigan’s oversight of programs
to produce and distribute key national
employment indicators positions him
well to steward the Institute’s research
initiatives on vibrant local economies and on
alternative work arrangements, said Donald
R. Parfet, chair of the Upjohn Institute
Board of Trustees. “His background in labor
economics and numerous leadership roles
at the BLS make him particularly well suited
to guide the Institute on an exciting strategic
path,” Parfet said.
“He has a lot of experience in this space
and a real eagerness to lead us,” Parfet said.
“He has the energetic drive to continue the
work that Randy has started.”
In addition to providing vision and
strategic direction, Horrigan also plans

to continue his own research, potentially
collaborating with Institute researchers
on topics such as workforce development,
automation and labor force participation.
“The researchers are doing exceptional work
and I’m looking forward to building on
that research in a way that has even greater
impact,” he said.
The Institute has focused on various
topics over the years but draws strength from
its unique position as a nonpartisan labor
market research nonprofit that is narrowly
focused on employment issues. “We
absolutely will want to go deeper,” Horrigan
said. “We want to leverage the things we
know how to do really well, in a way that’s
intentional.
“We’ll also look at going broader, while
at the same time be disciplined about which
initiatives we undertake,” he said. “We will
not go beyond our reach.”
Horrigan and his family will move to
Kalamazoo after his assignment begins.
Although Horrigan got a taste of the
Midwest during graduate work at Purdue
University and has relatives in Michigan,
he is still learning about the area. “There’s
a lot more than I realized,” he said. “I’m
excited about the education and cultural
opportunities Kalamazoo has to offer for me
and my family.”

NEW BOOK: Investing in America’s Workforce
Improving Outcomes for Workers and Employers
How can well-structured and effective
workforce programs and policies result in
better economic outcomes for individuals,
businesses, and communities?
Explore contemporary research, best
practices, and resources from more than 100
authors in the book Investing in America’s
Workforce: Improving Outcomes for Workers
and Employers.
The book is divided into three volumes:
1) Investing in Workers, 2) Investing in Work,
and 3) Investing in Systems for Employment

Opportunity. Each volume contains discrete
sections made up of chapters that identify
specific workforce development programs
and policies that provide positive returns to
society, to employers, and to job seekers.
Download the three volumes and
individual chapters for free at https://www
.investinwork.org/book.
Investing in America’s Workforce is
a Federal Reserve System initiative in
collaboration with the John J. Heldrich
Center for Workforce Development at

Rutgers University, the Ray Marshall
Center of the Lyndon B. Johnson School
at the University of Texas, and the
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment
Research.
Note: The policies and practices presented
in the book are intended to spur innovative
thinking that results in context-specific
solutions. The perspectives are not intended
as an endorsement from the Federal Reserve
System or its partnering institutions.
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